

F Y E O

1Intro's Swap Platform
(referred as 1DEX hereafter)

1Intro

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Security Level
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Executive Summary

Overview

1Intro engaged FYEO Inc. to perform a Security Code Review of 1DEX.

The assessment was conducted remotely by the FYEO Security Team. Testing focused on the following objectives:

- To provide the customer with an assessment of their overall security posture and any risks that were discovered within the environment during the engagement.
- To provide a professional opinion on the maturity, adequacy, and efficiency of the security measures that are in place.
- To identify potential issues and include improvement recommendations based on the results of our tests.

This report summarizes the engagement, tests performed, and findings. It also contains detailed descriptions of the discovered vulnerabilities, steps the FYEO Security Team took to identify and validate each issue, as well as any applicable recommendations for remediation.

Key Findings

The following issues have been identified during the testing period. These should be prioritized for remediation to reduce the risk they pose:

- FYEO-1INTRO-01 – Liquidity token mint can have any number of decimals
- FYEO-1INTRO-02 – Pools token accounts are not checked to be empty
- FYEO-1INTRO-03 – Code clarity
- FYEO-1INTRO-04 – Referrer swap fee account check could be extended
- FYEO-1INTRO-05 – Users can attempt to swap 0 amounts

Based on our review process, we conclude that the reviewed code implements the documented functionality.

Scope and Rules of Engagement

The FYEO Review Team performed a Security Code Review 1DEX. The following table documents the targets in scope for the engagement. No additional systems or resources were in scope for this assessment.

The source code was supplied through a private repository at <https://github.com/1intro/1intro-programs> with the commit hash 41a82354f27b49a1befcdddbb0f4628e3d167e8e.

Files included in the code review

```
1intro-programs/  
└─ programs/  
  └─ one-intro-swap/  
    └─ src/  
      └─ admins/  
        ├── admin_update_admin_auth.rs  
        ├── admin_update_fee_setting.rs  
        ├── admin_update_swap_fee_tier.rs  
        ├── admin_withdraw_token.rs  
        └─ mod.rs  
      └─ instructions/  
        ├── create_metadata_state.rs  
        ├── create_pool_state.rs  
        ├── exit_pool.rs  
        ├── join_pool.rs  
        ├── mod.rs  
        ├── swap_exact_amount_in.rs  
        └─ swap_exact_amount_out.rs  
      └─ states/  
        ├── metadata_state.rs  
        ├── mod.rs  
        └─ pool_state.rs  
      └─ utils/  
        ├── calc.rs  
        ├── consts.rs  
        ├── events.rs  
        └─ mod.rs  
      └─ error.rs  
      └─ lib.rs
```

Table 1: Scope

Technical Analyses and Findings

During the Security Code Review 1DEX, we discovered:

- 2 findings with LOW severity rating.
- 3 findings with INFORMATIONAL severity rating.

The following chart displays the findings by severity.




Figure 1: Findings by Severity

Findings

The *Findings* section provides detailed information on each of the findings, including methods of discovery, explanation of severity determination, recommendations, and applicable references.

The following table provides an overview of the findings.

Finding #	Severity	Description
FYEO-1INTRO-01	Low	Liquidity token mint can have any number of decimals
FYEO-1INTRO-02	Low	Pools token accounts are not checked to be empty
FYEO-1INTRO-03	Informational	Code clarity
FYEO-1INTRO-04	Informational	Referrer swap fee account check could be extended
FYEO-1INTRO-05	Informational	Users can attempt to swap 0 amounts

Table 2: Findings Overview

Technical Analysis

The source code has been manually validated to the extent that the state of the repository allowed. The validation includes confirming that the code correctly implements the intended functionality.

Conclusion

Based on our review process, we conclude that the code implements the documented functionality to the extent of the reviewed code.

Technical Findings

General Observations

The review of the 1DEX program for Solana reveals a well-structured codebase, implemented with a commendable emphasis on security practices. Notably, the thorough utilization of Anchors macros for account validation underscores a commitment to robustness. The presence of numerous tests is excellent, enhancing them with random amounts could further bolster resilience. It is noteworthy that the team promptly addressed all concerns raised during the review process. In essence, the absence of major issues underscores the solidity of the program, instilling confidence in its reliability and security.

Liquidity token mint can have any number of decimals

Finding ID: FYEO-1INTRO-01

Severity: **Low**

Status: **Remediated**

Description

The liquidity pool token is a user provided mint. It does not check the number of decimals configured or enforce a consistent number.

Proof of Issue

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/lib.rs

Line number: 361

```
#[account(  
    mut,  
    constraint = pool_lp_mint.freeze_authority.is_none()  
@ErrorCode::ConstraintMintFreezeAuthNone,  
    constraint = pool_lp_mint.mint_authority.unwrap() == *pool_auth_pda.key  
@ErrorCode::ConstraintPDAMintAuthority,  
    constraint = pool_lp_mint.supply == 0 @ErrorCode::ConstraintInvalidMintSupply,  
    owner = anchor_spl::token::ID @ErrorCode::OwnerTokenProgramID  
)]  
pub pool_lp_mint: Account<'info, Mint>,
```

Severity and Impact Summary

The number of decimals is arbitrary as it does not matter for the program's calculations. The decimals may however be used by 3rd parties and having them consistently set at some value may be beneficial. Also, it might become relevant with updates / features introduced at a later time.

Recommendation

Consider using a consistent value for the number of decimals.

Pools token accounts are not checked to be empty

Finding ID: FYEO-1INTRO-02

Severity: **Low**

Status: **Remediated**

Description

When creating a pool, the user supplied pool token accounts may have a balance greater than 0.

Proof of Issue

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/lib.rs

Line number: 338

```
#[account(  
    mut,  
    constraint = PoolState::valid_pool_token_account(&pool_auth_pda,  
&pool_token_0_mint.to_account_info(), &pool_token_0_account)  
    @ErrorCode::ConstraintInvalidTokenAccount,  
    owner = anchor_spl::token::ID @ErrorCode::OwnerTokenProgramID  
)]  
/// CHECK: address is checked  
pub pool_token_0_account: AccountInfo<'info>,
```

Severity and Impact Summary

This might indicate a user mistake and the funds would be lost as accounting is done without considering the token account balance. At this point however, the token account already belongs to the pool authority so the user would not be able to recover the funds anyway.

Recommendation

Considering possible future updates, it may be best to disallow token accounts with a positive balance.

Code clarity

Finding ID: FYEO-1INTRO-03

Severity: **Informational**

Status: **Remediated**

Description

There are a few places where the code's readability could be improved.

Proof of Issue

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/states/pool_state.rs

Line number: 114

```
pub fn valid_fee_tier<'info>(&self, metadata_state: &Box<Account<'info, MetadataState>>,
swap_fee_index: u64, swap_fee_ratio: u64) -> bool {
    if metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[swap_fee_index as usize] == swap_fee_ratio {
        return true;
    }
    false
}
```

This can be written in one line by removing the if, return true and false.

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/instructions/create_metadata_state.rs

Line number: 13

```
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[0] = 100000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[1] = 200000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[2] = 400000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[3] = 500000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[4] = 1600000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[5] = 3000000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[6] = 10000000;
self.metadata_state.swap_fee_tier_array[7] = 20000000;
```

Use `_` to keep large numbers legible. Such as: `1_600_000`.

Severity and Impact Summary

No security impact. These are suggestions to improve the code's clarity and maintainability.

Recommendation

Express the code in a concise fashion.

Referrer swap fee account check could be extended

Finding ID: FYEO-1INTRO-04

Severity: **Informational**

Status: **Open**

Description

The checks done for the referrer swap fee account could be extended. There is no risk with the current design.

Proof of Issue

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/instructions/swap_exact_amount_in.rs

Line number: 34

```
if self
    .pool_state
    .valid_referrer_token_account(&self.user.key(), &self.pool_token_in_account.mint,
&self.referrer_token_account)
{
    referrer_swap_fee_sharing_amount =
value_from_shares(self.metadata_state.referrer_swap_fee_sharing_ratio, swap_fee_amount,
PONE)?;
}
```

Severity and Impact Summary

This account could be equal to the `metadata_swap_fee_account` or `pool_token_in_account` accounts. This may not be entirely desirable, but due to the nature of token accounts and tokens being transferable to any account anyway, it is not of much concern.

Recommendation

Consider if it makes sense to exclude these accounts from receiving referral fees.

Users can attempt to swap 0 amounts

Finding ID: FYEO-1INTRO-05

Severity: **Informational**

Status: **Remediated**

Description

Users may attempt to swap with 0 amounts.

Proof of Issue

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/lib.rs

Line number: 430

```
#[account(  
    mut,  
    constraint = params.token_in_amount > 0 @ErrorCode::ConstraintInvalidTokenInAmount,  
    // owner = ID @ErrorCode::OwnerMyProgramID,  
)]
```

While this correctly checks that the user is not attempting to swap nothing, the check can be circumvented:

File name: programs/one-intro-swap/src/instructions/swap_exact_amount_in.rs

Line number: 10

```
pub fn process(&mut self, params: SwapExactAmountInParams) -> Result<()> {  
    // update token in amount as per user token account balance  
    let token_in_amount = std::cmp::min(params.token_in_amount,  
self.user_token_in_account.amount);
```

If the token account's amount is 0, the `token_in_amount` will be set to 0 here.

Severity and Impact Summary

The calculation will fail because of the 0 amount. Either way, 0 should not be an allowed amount and the custom error `ConstraintInvalidTokenInAmount` should be returned in case the token account has 0 tokens.

Recommendation

Check for this case and return an appropriate error.

Our Process

Methodology

FYEO Inc. uses the following high-level methodology when approaching engagements. They are broken up into the following phases.



Figure 2: Methodology Flow

Kickoff

The project is kicked off as the sales process has concluded. We typically set up a kickoff meeting where project stakeholders are gathered to discuss the project as well as the responsibilities of participants. During this meeting we verify the scope of the engagement and discuss the project activities. It's an opportunity for both sides to ask questions and get to know each other. By the end of the kickoff there is an understanding of the following:

- Designated points of contact
- Communication methods and frequency
- Shared documentation
- Code and/or any other artifacts necessary for project success
- Follow-up meeting schedule, such as a technical walkthrough
- Understanding of timeline and duration

Ramp-up

Ramp-up consists of the activities necessary to gain proficiency on the project. This can include the steps needed for familiarity with the codebase or technological innovation utilized. This may include, but is not limited to:

- Reviewing previous work in the area including academic papers
- Reviewing programming language constructs for specific languages
- Researching common flaws and recent technological advancements

Review

The review phase is where most of the work on the engagement is completed. This is the phase where we analyze the project for flaws and issues that impact the security posture. Depending on the project this may include an analysis of the architecture, a review of the code, and a specification matching to match the architecture to the implemented code.

In this code audit, we performed the following tasks:

1. Security analysis and architecture review of the original protocol
2. Review of the code written for the project
3. Compliance of the code with the provided technical documentation

The review for this project was performed using manual methods and utilizing the experience of the reviewer. No dynamic testing was performed, only the use of custom-built scripts and tools were used to assist the reviewer during the testing. We discuss our methodology in more detail in the following sections.

Code Safety

We analyzed the provided code, checking for issues related to the following categories:

- General code safety and susceptibility to known issues
- Poor coding practices and unsafe behavior
- Leakage of secrets or other sensitive data through memory mismanagement
- Susceptibility to misuse and system errors
- Error management and logging

This list is general and not comprehensive, meant only to give an understanding of the issues we are looking for.

Technical Specification Matching

We analyzed the provided documentation and checked that the code matches the specification. We checked for things such as:

- Proper implementation of the documented protocol phases
- Proper error handling
- Adherence to the protocol logical description

Reporting

FYEO Inc. delivers a draft report that contains an executive summary, technical details, and observations about the project.

The executive summary contains an overview of the engagement including the number of findings as well as a statement about our general risk assessment of the project. We may conclude that the overall risk is low but depending on what was assessed we may conclude that more scrutiny of the project is needed.

We report security issues identified, as well as informational findings for improvement, categorized by the following labels:

- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Informational

The technical details are aimed more at developers, describing the issues, the severity ranking and recommendations for mitigation.

As we perform the audit, we may identify issues that aren't security related, but are general best practices and steps that can be taken to lower the attack surface of the project. We will call those out as we encounter them and as time permits.

As an optional step, we can agree on the creation of a public report that can be shared and distributed with a larger audience.

Verify

After the preliminary findings have been delivered, this could be in the form of the approved communication channel or delivery of the draft report, we will verify any fixes within a window of time specified in the project. After the fixes have been verified, we will change the status of the finding in the report from open to remediated.

The output of this phase will be a final report with any mitigated findings noted.

Additional Note

It is important to note that, although we did our best in our analysis, no code audit or assessment is a guarantee of the absence of flaws. Our effort was constrained by resource and time limits along with the scope of the agreement.

While assessing the severity of the findings, we considered the impact, ease of exploitability, and the probability of attack. This is a solid baseline for severity determination.

The Classification of vulnerabilities

Security vulnerabilities and areas for improvement are weighted into one of several categories using, but is not limited to, the criteria listed below:

Critical – vulnerability will lead to a loss of protected assets

- This is a vulnerability that would lead to immediate loss of protected assets
- The complexity to exploit is low
- The probability of exploit is high

High - vulnerability has potential to lead to a loss of protected assets

- All discrepancies found where there is a security claim made in the documentation that cannot be found in the code
- All mismatches from the stated and actual functionality
- Unprotected key material
- Weak encryption of keys
- Badly generated key materials
- Txn signatures not verified
- Spending of funds through logic errors
- Calculation errors overflows and underflows

Medium - vulnerability hampers the uptime of the system or can lead to other problems

- Insecure calls to third party libraries
- Use of untested or nonstandard or non-peer-reviewed crypto functions
- Program crashes, leaves core dumps or writes sensitive data to log files

Low – vulnerability has a security impact but does not directly affect the protected assets

- Overly complex functions
- Unchecked return values from 3rd party libraries that could alter the execution flow

Informational

- General recommendations